David Anthony Babb, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit in the District Court for the District of South Carolina alleging violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sued a mix of private individuals and entities, including the CEO of a veterans' organization, a city police officer, the South Carolina Attorney General, and a state health agent. Babb's complaint sought to hold these defendants liable for actions taken against him, but the district court dismissed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The district court also denied Babb's motions to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and his request for court-appointed counsel. Babb appealed, challenging the dismissal and the denial of his post-judgment motions.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal de novo, applying the plausibility standard established in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. Under this standard, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face, rather than merely conclusory allegations. The court found that Babb failed to allege plausible facts demonstrating that the private defendants, specifically David Isom and Rudy Socha, acted as state actors. The opinion emphasizes that under Supreme Court precedent, specifically Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, the mere fact that the state licenses, contracts with, or regulates a private entity is insufficient to transform that private conduct into state action. The court also addressed Babb's arguments regarding admiralty jurisdiction and a First Amendment claim related to access to a parking lot, finding that the district court did not err in declining to exercise jurisdiction or in its analysis of the First Amendment elements. Regarding the post-judgment motions, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard. It noted that a Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to present new arguments or evidence that could have been raised earlier, nor can it be used to advance a novel legal theory. The court found no reversible error in the district court's denial of these motions or its refusal to appoint counsel.
The dismissal of Babb's § 1983 claims stands, effectively precluding him from pursuing civil rights liability against the named private defendants and entities based on the current record. The decision reinforces the high bar for establishing state action liability when suing private parties, clarifying that state regulation or licensing alone does not create such liability. Babb is barred from pursuing the specific claims and arguments raised in this appeal, and the district court's refusal to appoint counsel or allow amendment of the complaint remains in effect.
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