1st Cir.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ANTONIO CAMILLO

January 27, 2026 ·25-1472 ·Panel Decision ·Lynch · By James Taylor

The First Circuit affirmed the revocation of Antonio Camillo's supervised release following a state vandalism conviction. The court held that the district court properly relied on corroborated hearsay and found sufficient evidence of malice and property damage.

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Antonio Camillo was serving a term of supervised release following a federal conviction for conspiracy and distribution of fentanyl. In January 2025, Camillo was involved in a domestic disturbance at an apartment in Lowell, Massachusetts. After an argument with his wife, Karina Rajotte, Camillo threw his elbow at her, left the apartment, and then returned to kick in the locked door to retrieve his phone, causing damage to the door frame. He was charged with state crimes including vandalism, assault, and larceny. Although the state charges were later dismissed because Rajotte invoked marital privilege and refused to testify, federal probation filed a petition to revoke Camillo's supervised release based on the new criminal offense. At the revocation hearing, the government relied on a police report and a prior affidavit from Rajotte, as well as testimony from the responding officer who observed the damage. Camillo argued that the revocation was improper because it relied on unreliable hearsay and that the evidence failed to prove the elements of the state crime.

The First Circuit reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion, applying a clear error standard to factual findings. The court addressed two primary arguments from Camillo. First, regarding the hearsay objection under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C), the court explained that while a releasee has a limited right to confront witnesses, the district court may deny confrontation if the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear. The district court found that Rajotte's invocation of marital privilege justified her absence and that her statements were reliable because they were consistent and corroborated by Officer O'Connor's firsthand observations of the broken door frame. The appellate court found no error in this balancing, noting that the hearsay was not the sole basis for the finding and that the officer's testimony independently supported the account of the damage. Second, regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for vandalism, the court clarified that the government only needed to prove the property was owned or possessed by someone other than Camillo, which the police report established. The court also found ample evidence of malice and wantonness, as Camillo intentionally kicked a locked door with sufficient force to cause damage, demonstrating a reckless disregard for the property's destruction. The court rejected Camillo's arguments that the evidence was insufficient, concluding that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous.

The decision affirms the district court's judgment, resulting in Camillo's continued imprisonment and a new term of supervised release. The ruling reinforces that supervised release revocation hearings are not bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence and that hearsay may be admitted if the court finds it reliable and the witness's absence is justified. It also clarifies the evidentiary threshold for proving vandalism elements in this context, emphasizing that corroboration of a witness's account by an officer's observations can satisfy reliability requirements even if the witness does not testify.

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