Edina and Redzo Hodzic, Bosnian Muslims from the Sandzak region, entered the United States in 2000 using forged Slovenian passports. They claimed fear of persecution due to the Bosnian genocide and NATO bombing, but were charged with fraud and lack of valid entry documents. After initial removal proceedings and a voluntary dismissal of a prior appeal, the Hodzics sought to reopen their case multiple times. In 2020 and 2021, they filed motions to reopen sua sponte, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland created a fundamental change in case law that made them eligible for cancellation of removal. They also cited their daughter's severe medical conditions and their own health issues as grounds for exceptional hardship. The BIA denied these motions in 2024, finding that the Hodzics did not present an 'exceptional situation' warranting reopening. The Hodzics then sought judicial review, alleging legal and constitutional errors in the BIA's decision.
Chief Judge Gelpí, writing for the panel, first addressed the jurisdictional threshold. While courts generally cannot review the BIA's discretionary denial of a motion to reopen sua sponte, they retain limited jurisdiction to correct legal or constitutional errors. The court determined that the Hodzics failed to raise any colorable claims. Regarding legal errors, the court rejected the argument that the BIA must apply the statutory definition of 'exceptional circumstances' to the regulatory 'exceptional situations' standard, noting these are distinct concepts governing different types of motions. The court also found no requirement for the BIA to provide a detailed explanation for sua sponte denials, distinguishing this from timely appeals. On the Niz-Chavez argument, the court clarified that while a fundamental change in case law may constitute an exceptional situation, it does not mandate reopening; the BIA retains discretion to deny the motion even if such a change is present. The court further held that Loper Bright v. Raimondo, which ended Chevron deference, was inapplicable because the case involved discretionary authority rather than statutory interpretation. On constitutional grounds, the court ruled that the BIA's discretionary authority does not create a cognizable liberty interest for procedural due process purposes. Additionally, the Hodzics' substantive due process claim regarding family integrity was waived because they failed to develop the argument in their brief.
The Hodzics' petitions for review are denied, leaving the BIA's orders in place. The decision reinforces that the BIA has broad discretion to deny motions to reopen sua sponte and that a change in case law like Niz-Chavez does not automatically entitle a petitioner to relief. The ruling clarifies that the 'exceptional situations' standard is distinct from the statutory 'exceptional circumstances' definition and that courts will not intervene absent a colorable legal or constitutional error.
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