James Garrey was convicted of first-degree murder in Massachusetts in 1999. During jury selection, the prosecution used a peremptory challenge to remove Juror 6-7, a minority-race prospective juror. Garrey's counsel objected, arguing the strike was based on race in violation of Batson v. Kentucky and Powers v. Ohio. The trial judge engaged in a colloquy where the prosecutor initially cited the juror's husband's occupation as a guidance counselor, then corrected herself to say the juror herself was a guidance counselor. The judge allowed the strike, noting the lack of minority victims or witnesses in the case. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, rejecting Garrey's arguments that the judge improperly supplied the reason for the strike and that the occupation was per se inadequate. Garrey subsequently filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was denied by the district court.
The First Circuit applied the highly deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which requires federal courts to grant habeas relief only if the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of facts. The court analyzed the Batson three-step framework. At step two, the prosecutor provided a race-neutral explanation: the juror was a guidance counselor. The court noted that under Purkett v. Elem, the explanation need not be persuasive, only race-neutral. The state court found this sufficient, and the First Circuit agreed it was not an unreasonable application of law. At step three, the trial judge evaluated the explanation. Garrey argued the judge substituted his own reason, but the First Circuit found the state court's reading of the record—that the judge was evaluating the prosecutor's reason rather than inventing one—was a reasonable factual determination. Regarding the Powers claim, the court addressed the trial judge's comments about the racial composition of the parties. The First Circuit concluded that while the judge noted the lack of minority victims or witnesses, this did not imply the defendant lacked standing to object. The state court's footnote clarifying that the defendant is entitled to a discrimination-free process, even if races differ, was a reasonable application of Powers. The court emphasized that the record was less than clear, and under AEDPA, the federal court cannot substitute its judgment for the state court's if 'reasonable minds' could disagree on the interpretation.
The decision affirms the conviction and leaves the state court's factual findings intact. It reinforces the high bar for federal habeas petitioners challenging jury selection decisions, particularly when the trial record is ambiguous. The court acknowledged that the trial judge could have been more explicit in following the Batson procedure but declined to find reversible error. No remand instructions were issued; the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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