5th Cir.

United States of America v. Luciano Diaz-Contreras

March 27, 2026 ·25-50231 ·Per Curiam · By James Taylor

The Fifth Circuit affirmed a federal sentence, holding that a prior four-year state firearms conviction counts toward criminal history points even if the defendant did not physically serve the full term. The court also rejected a challenge to a supervised release revocation, finding the district court properly considered the defendant's history and the need for public protection.

Luciano Diaz-Contreras pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States and was sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison plus three years of supervised release. In a related proceeding, he was also sentenced to twenty-four months in prison for violating the terms of his supervised release stemming from a 2017 firearms conviction. Diaz-Contreras appealed both sentences, arguing that the district court incorrectly assigned three criminal history points for his prior state firearms offense and that the revocation sentence was based on impermissible retributive factors. He raised neither argument in the district court, meaning the Fifth Circuit would review the claims only for plain error.

The court applied the four-prong plain error standard from Puckett v. United States, which requires a clear error affecting substantial rights that seriously impacts the fairness of judicial proceedings. First, regarding the criminal history points, the Sentencing Guidelines assign three points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month. The commentary clarifies that a defendant must have 'actually served a period of imprisonment' on that sentence. Diaz-Contreras argued he did not serve time on the four-year state firearms sentence, only on a separate resisting arrest charge. However, the court found it was not clear or obvious that he was not in custody for the firearm charge during the period he was held, as he received credit for over four years of time served. Under Fifth Circuit precedent, time served before a conviction that is credited toward that conviction counts as time served on the conviction. Because there was reasonable dispute over whether the time was credited to the firearm charge, the district court's calculation was not clearly erroneous. Second, regarding the revocation sentence, the district court cited factors including Diaz-Contreras's repeated noncompliance, breach of trust, recidivism, and the need to deter future crime and protect the public. The court held it was not clear or obvious that the district court relied on impermissible retributive factors, as the cited reasons align with proper considerations under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and § 3553(a).

The original sentences remain in effect. The decision reinforces that the definition of 'sentence of imprisonment' for criminal history calculations focuses on the imposed term and credited time rather than the actual days physically spent in custody, provided the time is credited to the specific conviction. It also clarifies that district courts have broad discretion to consider a defendant's history and the need for public protection when revoking supervised release without running afoul of plain error review.