Julius Augillard was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and appealed his 70-month sentence. The district court had determined his base offense level based on a 2011 Louisiana conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, applying an enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense. Augillard challenged the classification of his prior conviction, arguing that the Louisiana statute was facially overbroad compared to federal law and that he should not need to cite a specific case where the state applied the statute to conduct outside the federal definition. He also argued the firearm enhancement was speculative. Additionally, the written judgment included a mandatory outpatient treatment condition for supervised release, which Augillard argued conflicted with the oral pronouncement at sentencing.
The court addressed four issues. First, regarding the controlled substance offense classification, the court held that the realistic probability test from Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez remains good law. The court rejected Augillard's argument that Taylor and Brown abrogated the requirement for an actual case showing a state statute's overbreadth. The court noted that Taylor declined to extend the test only because there were no federalism concerns or overlapping elements, but did not overturn Duenas-Alvarez. Since Augillard failed to identify a Louisiana case where the statute was applied to Ioflupane, he failed the realistic probability test, and the prior conviction properly counted. Second, regarding the firearm enhancement, the court found no clear error in the district court's factual finding. Unlike Jeffries, where a single rock of crack was insufficient, Augillard possessed a large volume of drugs in distinct packaging alongside a loaded firearm during Mardi Gras. This supported a finding that the gun facilitated the drug trafficking. Third, regarding the supervised release condition, the court found a conflict between the written judgment and the oral pronouncement. The written judgment required Augillard to participate in an outpatient treatment program, but the oral pronouncement only made this a possibility if he tested positive for drugs. Because the condition was discretionary and not mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3538(d), the district court was required to pronounce it orally. The court held that the oral pronouncement controls and the written judgment must be amended to remove the broadened condition.
The decision affirms the application of the realistic probability test in the Fifth Circuit, requiring defendants to point to actual state cases to prove a statute is overbroad, even if the statute is facially broader than federal law. It clarifies that the oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over the written judgment when a discretionary condition is omitted from the oral ruling. The case is remanded solely to correct the written judgment to match the oral pronouncement regarding the supervised release condition, leaving the 70-month sentence intact.