Andrew Ducksworth was stopped by Hattiesburg police for a defective tag light. During the stop, the officer found a firearm in the driver's lap after the driver initially lied about it. When the officer asked the passenger, Ducksworth, to exit the vehicle, Ducksworth revealed he was paralyzed from the waist down. Despite this, the officer frisked Ducksworth, felt an object between his legs, and arrested him for possessing a firearm. Ducksworth, a convicted felon, was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the frisk lacked reasonable suspicion, and moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the statute violated the Second Amendment. He also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his prior conviction. The district court denied all motions, and Ducksworth was sentenced to thirty-six months in prison.
The court addressed three main issues. First, regarding the Fourth Amendment, the court applied the two-step Terry framework. It acknowledged that Ybarra v. Illinois prohibits 'guilt-by-association,' where mere proximity to a suspect is insufficient for a search. However, the court distinguished Ybarra, noting that drivers and passengers are often engaged in a 'common enterprise.' The court reasoned that it would be 'beyond folly' for officers to ignore a hidden firearm in a driver's lap, especially when the driver lied about it. The court found that the combination of the driver's weapon, the driver's dishonesty, the high-crime area, and Ducksworth's own behavior—opening his door as if to exit before claiming paralysis—created 'reasonable, individualized suspicion' that Ducksworth was armed and dangerous. Second, on the sufficiency of the evidence, the court rejected Ducksworth's argument that the government must prove the specific predicate felony. Citing Old Chief v. United States and United States v. Broadnax, the court held that Ducksworth's stipulation to being 'convicted in a court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term in excess of one year' satisfied the statutory element as a matter of law. Third, regarding the Second Amendment, the court dismissed both facial and as-applied challenges. The facial challenge was foreclosed by United States v. Diaz, and the as-applied challenge failed because Ducksworth was on supervised release at the time of the arrest, a status that precludes such challenges under United States v. Kimble.
The decision clarifies that in the Fifth Circuit, a passenger's reasonable suspicion to be frisked can be established by a driver's possession of a weapon and deceptive behavior, even if the passenger is physically disabled. It reinforces that stipulations to prior felony convictions satisfy the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) without requiring proof of the specific underlying crime. The ruling also solidifies that individuals on supervised release cannot mount as-applied Second Amendment challenges to felon-in-possession statutes. The case was remanded to the district court to enforce the original sentence.
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