Former student-athletes from Southern Methodist University's women's rowing team sued the university for gender-based discrimination under Title IX and negligence, alleging that systemic disparities in coaching and medical treatment caused their hip injuries. SMU moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The district court granted summary judgment for SMU against eight plaintiffs, dismissing their claims as time-barred, while allowing one plaintiff, Kelly McGowan, to proceed with specific damages claims. After the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the eight plaintiffs in a prior decision, SMU sought to recover its litigation costs as the prevailing party. The district court awarded SMU $184,033.11 for deposition videos, transcripts, and copying, reducing the initial request to exclude costs deemed unnecessary. The eight dismissed plaintiffs appealed the costs award, arguing SMU was not a prevailing party and that the costs were excessive.
The court addressed three primary issues. First, it determined that SMU was a prevailing party. Under Fifth Circuit precedent, a party need not prevail on every issue to be considered prevailing; they must only secure a judicial imprimatur that materially alters the legal relationship. Because SMU obtained summary judgment with prejudice against eight of the nine plaintiffs, it met this standard, regardless of the one plaintiff's remaining claims. Second, the court evaluated the Pacheco factors, which guide a district court's discretion to deny costs. The plaintiffs argued that their limited resources, the complexity of Title IX, the public benefit of the litigation, and SMU's financial resources weighed against an award. The court rejected these arguments, noting that limited resources of the losing party do not automatically preclude costs, the legal issues were settled by the statute of limitations, the public benefit cited was not concrete, and SMU's status as a non-profit weighed against the 'enormous financial resources' factor. Third, the court analyzed the necessity of the specific costs. It held that 28 U.S.C. § 1920 permits recovery for both video recordings and written transcripts of depositions when they are necessary for trial preparation, not merely for convenience. The court found the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding these fees because the witnesses were outside subpoena range and the depositions were used in motion practice. Regarding copying costs, the court affirmed that scanning is equivalent to copying and is recoverable, but agreed that costs for data extraction, storage, and unnecessary multiple copies were properly excluded.
The decision reinforces the strong presumption in favor of awarding costs to prevailing parties in civil litigation, even when one plaintiff's claims survive summary judgment. It clarifies that federal courts in the Fifth Circuit may tax both video and transcript costs for depositions if they are necessary for trial preparation, aligning the circuit with the Sixth and Tenth Circuits. The ruling also confirms that scanning documents is a taxable copying cost but limits recoverable expenses to those explicitly authorized by statute, excluding data extraction and storage fees. SMU will receive the awarded costs, and the case is remanded for the entry of judgment consistent with the opinion.
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