11th Cir.

Manzini v. Cypress

May 1, 2026 ·1:24-cv-24670-RAR ·Per Curiam · By Maria Santos

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's claims under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and Florida state law, holding that statutory policy declarations do not create a private right of action. The court further ruled that the district court properly denied the plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment because the attempt merely relitigated failed arguments.

Listen to this decision 0:00 / 2:35

Nicolas Manzini, proceeding pro se, appealed from a district court order dismissing his amended complaint against tribal officials and the Miccosukee Gaming Agency. Manzini alleged violations of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), regulations of the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC), and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), while seeking equitable relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The district court dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim and denied Manzini's motion to alter or amend the judgment, finding that any further amendment would be futile. Manzini argued the district court erred in both rulings, specifically contending that the policy statements within IGRA provided him with a private right to sue.

The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, applying the standard that amendment is futile if the complaint would still be subject to dismissal. The court anchored its analysis in the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, which mandates that private rights of action must be created by Congress. The court explained that the judicial task is to discern whether a statute displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy, looking for clear and unambiguous language conferring such rights. Manzini relied on IGRA's declaration of policy, which states the Act's purpose is to regulate gaming to shield tribes from crime and ensure fair conduct. The court rejected this argument, noting that articulated purposes of statutes do not regulate parties, protect individual rights, or serve as operative law. Instead, they merely explain the chapter that follows. Because the policy provision itself does not confer rights or remedies, it cannot support a private cause of action. Consequently, the district court correctly dismissed the claim with prejudice. Regarding the Rule 59(e) motion, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard. The court noted that such motions cannot be used to relitigate old matters or raise arguments that could have been presented earlier. Manzini's motion failed to show manifest errors of law or fact, instead attempting to relitigate his failed claim by citing inapposite cases and reasserting portions of his previous pleadings.

The decision reinforces the strict requirement that plaintiffs must identify specific statutory language granting a private remedy to enforce federal laws like IGRA. Policy statements alone are insufficient to support litigation. The ruling effectively closes the door on Manzini's specific claims and serves as a warning to pro se litigants that motions to alter or amend judgments will be denied if they merely repackage failed arguments. No remand instructions were issued as the dismissal was affirmed.

Play