11th Cir.

COREY L. MCCLAIN v. RAPID RECOVERY AGENCY, INC

April 1, 2026 ·0:24-cv-60093-WPD ·Per Curiam · By Maria Santos

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law, holding that a repossession agent did not breach the peace under Florida law. The court found that superficial property damage and a debtor's statement about making a payment, without further objection or confrontation, were insufficient to convert a peaceful repossession into a breach of the peace.

Corey McClain sued Rapid Recovery Agency, Inc., following the repossession of his vehicle from his girlfriend's grandparents' driveway. McClain alleged that the repossession agent breached the peace under Florida law and violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA). The dispute centered on whether the agent's actions—specifically towing the car after McClain claimed he had made a payment and causing minor scratches to the driveway—constituted a breach of the peace. The district court granted Rapid Recovery's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding no breach of the peace due to the lack of confrontation and the superficial nature of the damage. The court also rejected the FCCPA claim, noting McClain had not argued that the FCCPA's definition of a debt collector differed from the FDCPA's. McClain appealed, arguing the district court erred in its legal standards and factual findings.

The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying Florida law to determine what constitutes a breach of the peace. The court noted that while Florida law permits self-help repossession without a breach of the peace, it does not define the term explicitly. Citing Florida precedent, the court explained that a breach of the peace generally requires entry onto premises without consent or, in the case of a driveway, an objection by the debtor that is ignored. The court analyzed McClain's specific arguments regarding property damage and the payment objection. Regarding the damage, the court found the scratches to the driveway and lawn were 'superficial' and 'de minimis,' distinguishing them from prior cases where significant destruction of property or business records occurred. The court emphasized that no Florida case supported the proposition that such minor damage alone converts a peaceful repossession into a breach of the peace. On the issue of the payment objection, the court found that while McClain informed the driver of a payment, he did not demand a delay or argue that the repossession should stop. Instead, he retrieved his belongings and handed over the keys, indicating consent to the removal. The court also addressed the FCCPA claim, noting that McClain had not preserved the argument that the FCCPA's definition of a debt collector is broader than the FDCPA's, as he had previously argued the two statutes were identical in this regard. Consequently, the court declined to consider the new argument on appeal.

The decision affirms the district court's judgment, meaning Rapid Recovery is not liable for breach of the peace or violations of the FDCPA and FCCPA based on the facts presented. The ruling clarifies that under Florida law, superficial property damage and a debtor's statement about payment, without a clear demand to cease or a confrontation, do not constitute a breach of the peace. This limits the ability of debtors to use minor property damage or payment disputes to invalidate self-help repossessions. The case remains closed with no remand, as the appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision.