11th Cir.

Raymond L. Strong v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

March 23, 2026 ·6:23-cv-00486-JSS-DCI ·Per Curiam · By James Taylor

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Raymond L. Strong's appeal because his notice of appeal was filed after the statutory deadline expired. The court found that Strong failed to meet the requirements for reopening the appeal period under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6).

Raymond L. Strong, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appealed from a district court judgment entered on May 6, 2025, which denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Strong filed his notice of appeal on July 2, 2025, after delivering it to prison authorities for mailing. The Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections argued that the appeal was untimely and that Strong was not entitled to relief under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6). The case was placed on the Non-Argument Calendar, and the court issued jurisdictional questions to determine if the appeal was timely or if the notice should be treated as a motion to reopen the appeal period.

The court began by establishing that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a), a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the judgment is entered. For state prisoners, the prison mailbox rule under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(c)(1) deems the notice filed on the date it is delivered to prison authorities. In this case, the district court entered judgment on May 6, 2025, meaning the deadline to appeal was June 5, 2025. Strong did not deliver his notice until July 2, making it untimely on its face. The court then addressed whether the late notice could be construed as a motion to reopen the appeal period under Rule 4(a)(6). This rule allows a district court to reopen the time to appeal if the moving party did not receive notice of the order within 21 days of entry, provided the motion is filed within 180 days of entry or 14 days of receiving notice, whichever is earlier. The court found that Strong received notice of the order on June 6, 2025. Consequently, the 14-day window to move for relief expired on June 20. Because Strong's notice was deemed a motion to reopen but was not filed until July 2, it failed to meet the strict deadline of Rule 4(a)(6).

The appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and all pending motions are denied as moot. This decision reinforces the strict adherence to appellate deadlines for habeas petitioners. While the prison mailbox rule protects prisoners who mail notices on time, it does not cure untimeliness if the prisoner fails to file a motion to reopen within 14 days of actually receiving the district court's order. The case leaves no open questions regarding the specific timeline in this instance, as the court found the motion to reopen was filed too late.