Gabriella Oropesa and three co-conspirators planned and executed a series of vandalism attacks against crisis-pregnancy centers in Florida during the spring and summer of 2022. The group, wearing disguises, spray-painted threatening messages on the facilities, including slogans like 'If abortions aren't SAFE then niether [sic] are you.' Oropesa was indicted for one count of conspiracy against rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241, alleging she conspired to violate the rights secured by the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act). The FACE Act prohibits the use of force or threats to intimidate individuals seeking or providing reproductive health services. Oropesa moved to dismiss the indictment twice, first arguing that the FACE Act's specific enforcement mechanism precluded the use of Section 241, and later arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions in Fischer and Snyder rendered Section 241 inapplicable to the FACE Act. The district court denied both motions, and Oropesa was convicted and sentenced to 120 days in prison followed by three years of supervised release.
The Eleventh Circuit addressed two primary arguments on appeal. First, regarding the statutory scope, the court analyzed whether a conspiracy to violate the FACE Act falls within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 241. The court noted that Section 241 is a broad statute reaching conspiracies to violate any right secured by the 'laws of the United States.' Oropesa argued that because the FACE Act provides its own 'comprehensive enforcement scheme,' Congress intended to preclude the use of Section 241 as a 'catchall' statute. The court rejected this analogy to Section 1983 civil rights litigation, explaining that the presumption against implied private causes of action does not apply to the criminal conspiracy statute. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the FACE Act itself contains a saving clause stating that its remedies are not exclusive. The court held that the FACE Act secures a federal right, and Section 241 explicitly covers conspiracies to violate such rights. Second, the court addressed Oropesa's claim that the Supreme Court's decisions in Fischer v. United States and Snyder v. United States compelled a different outcome. The court found these cases irrelevant to the relationship between Section 241 and the FACE Act. Fischer limited the scope of obstruction statutes by looking at specific statutory text, while Snyder distinguished between bribes and gratuities based on sentencing disparities for identical conduct. The court reasoned that Section 241 and the FACE Act punish different offenses—conspiracy versus substantive violation—and that Congress has long authorized harsher penalties for conspiracies. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Oropesa's untimely motion to dismiss based on these intervening decisions.
The decision affirms that 18 U.S.C. § 241 remains a viable tool for prosecuting conspiracies to violate the FACE Act, regardless of the FACE Act's own penalties. It clarifies that the 'comprehensive enforcement scheme' doctrine from civil rights cases does not limit the scope of the criminal conspiracy statute. The conviction stands, and the defendant must serve her sentence of 120 days imprisonment followed by supervised release. The ruling leaves open the question of whether other federal statutes with specific enforcement schemes might similarly be subject to Section 241 conspiracy charges, but it firmly establishes that the FACE Act is not one of them.