Three minor victims of sex trafficking—A.G., G.W., and C.B.—sued hotel operators in the Northern District of Georgia under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and Georgia common law negligence. A.G. and G.W. were trafficked at the United Inn and Suites, where their trafficker frequently interacted with front desk staff, who readmitted the minors to their rooms without identification or reservation names. C.B. was trafficked at The Hilltop Inn by a registered sex offender, where hotel management moved him to a specific area for sex offenders, rented him a second room next door, and instructed housekeeping not to clean that room. The district courts granted summary judgment for the hotels, ruling that mere room rentals and general awareness of trafficking did not constitute 'participation in a venture' under the TVPRA, and that the minors were licensees rather than invitees under Georgia law. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing the hotels' specific actions crossed the line into active facilitation.
The Eleventh Circuit applied de novo review, viewing facts in the light most favorable to the non-movants. The court first clarified the 'participation in a venture' element of a TVPRA beneficiary claim. Citing its precedent in Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., the court held that a defendant must take part in a common enterprise involving risk and potential profit, sharing legal risks and profits with traffickers. The court rejected the argument that merely renting a room with knowledge of trafficking is sufficient, stating that 'observing something is not the same as participating in it.' However, the court found that 'something more' than an ordinary buyer-seller transaction exists when a hotel offers 'personalized support.' For A.G. and G.W., the evidence showed staff readmitted minors locked out of their rooms without ID, a specific act of cooperation that went beyond passive nonfeasance. For C.B., the evidence showed management moved a known sex offender to a designated area, rented a second room next door, and instructed staff to limit cleaning, which a jury could find as personal support enabling the trafficking. Second, the court addressed the 'knowledge' element. It held that the TVPRA requires knowledge that the venture engaged in trafficking, but explicitly rejected the requirement that the defendant must know the identity of the specific victim. The court reasoned that the statutory language 'knew or should have known has engaged in an act' does not demand specific victim identification. Finally, regarding negligence, the court ruled that the minors were invitees, not licensees, because the hotel benefited from their presence through room rentals and convenience store purchases, and their unlawful purpose did not negate the lawful purpose of their stay.
The judgments are vacated and the cases are remanded to the district courts for trial. Hotel operators can no longer rely on summary judgment solely by arguing they only provided standard room rentals; they must now face jury determinations on whether their specific actions constituted personalized support. The decision establishes that constructive knowledge of trafficking is sufficient for liability without proof of the victim's identity, and clarifies that trafficking victims may qualify as invitees under Georgia law if the hotel derives mutual benefit from their presence.