Upside Foods, a California-based startup producing lab-grown chicken, sought to sell its product in Florida. After the USDA granted Upside a Grant of Inspection and labeling approval, allowing it to sell in interstate commerce, Florida enacted SB 1084. This law made it unlawful to manufacture, sell, hold, or distribute cultivated meat within the state, imposing criminal and civil penalties. Upside sued, arguing that the federal Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) preempted Florida's ban because the federal government had already regulated the product. The district court denied Upside's motion for a preliminary injunction, ruling that the ban did not regulate the company's facilities or ingredients. During the appeal, the district court dismissed Upside's preemption claims in an amended complaint, raising a mootness issue that the Eleventh Circuit resolved before addressing the merits.
The Eleventh Circuit addressed three primary issues: mootness, the existence of a private cause of action, and the merits of the preemption claim. First, the court held the appeal was not moot despite the district court's dismissal of preemption claims in an amended complaint, noting that an interlocutory appeal stands on the record at the time of the district court's ruling and that the district court cannot defeat appellate jurisdiction by issuing additional orders. Second, the court affirmed that Upside has a cause of action in equity to challenge the state law as preempted, distinguishing the Supreme Court's decision in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, which concerned compelling state payments, from this case which seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a state law. The court clarified that the PPIA's exclusive enforcement clause applies to federal enforcement against processors, not to private suits challenging state laws under the Supremacy Clause. On the merits, the court analyzed the PPIA's Facilities and Ingredients Provisions. Regarding the Facilities Provision, the court reasoned that the phrase 'with respect to premises, facilities and operations' requires a direct relationship to onsite operations. Because SB 1084 bans the sale of the product rather than dictating how facilities must operate, it does not preempt the state law. The court distinguished National Meat Association v. Harris, where a California law regulated onsite handling of nonambulatory animals, noting that Florida's law merely bans the end product. Regarding the Ingredients Provision, the court held that a ban on a product is not an 'ingredient requirement.' The term 'ingredient' refers to components of a mixture, such as additives or binders, not the cellular source of the meat. Therefore, states retain the authority to ban specific types of meat for human consumption even if the federal government regulates their production.
The decision affirms Florida's ban on the sale and distribution of lab-grown meat, allowing the state to prohibit Upside Foods from selling its products within its borders. The ruling clarifies that federal food safety regulations do not automatically override state bans on specific meat products unless those state laws directly regulate the physical operations or ingredients of the processing facilities. Upside Foods remains unable to distribute its lab-grown chicken in Florida, and the company may need to pursue other legal theories or legislative avenues to challenge the ban.