Erika Kelley Day was convicted of two federal offenses: methamphetamine possession with intent to distribute and using a firearm during a drug crime. Each count carried a mandatory five-year statutory minimum sentence, to be served consecutively. Day pleaded guilty and entered a plea agreement where the government promised to move for a downward departure if her cooperation resulted in substantial assistance. After Day provided significant help to federal agents over two years, including wearing a wire and testifying against other defendants, the government moved to depart below the statutory minimum for the drug count only. The district court granted the motion but, believing it had the discretion to do so, also reduced the sentence for the separate firearm count to one day. The government objected, arguing the reduction for the firearm count was illegal because no motion was filed for that specific offense.
Chief Judge William Pryor, writing for the court, analyzed the text and structure of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), which permits a departure from a statutory minimum only 'upon motion of the Government.' The court emphasized that the statute uses the singular when referring to 'a level established by statute as a minimum sentence,' indicating that the authority to depart is offense-specific. The court noted that while sentences are often pronounced as an aggregate for administrative purposes, each offense retains a separate statutory minimum. Because the government did not move to depart below the minimum for the firearm count, the district court lacked the independent authority to do so. The court rejected Day's argument that the plea agreement implicitly required the government to file a motion for both counts, stating that 'silence is not ambiguity' and the agreement reserved the government's sole discretion to determine the extent of any departure request. The court also clarified that a breach of a plea agreement cannot grant a district court the authority to bypass statutory text.
The decision clarifies that sentencing courts must strictly adhere to the specific counts for which the government files a substantial assistance motion. It prevents district judges from unilaterally reducing statutory minimums for offenses not covered by the government's motion, even if the defendant provided significant assistance. The case is remanded for resentencing, meaning Day will likely face the full five-year statutory minimum for the firearm count, though the prosecutor retains discretion to file a new motion for that count if they choose to do so.