Allied Universal Security Services employs security officers, lieutenants, and captains at the Turkey Point nuclear power facility in Florida. When the International Union, Security Police and Fire Professionals of America sought to represent the lieutenants, Allied Universal objected, arguing that the lieutenants were supervisors and therefore ineligible to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act. The NLRB regional director held a hearing where both parties presented evidence regarding the lieutenants' authority to discipline security officers. The regional director found that the lieutenants' disciplinary actions were mechanistic applications of detailed company policies and subject to review by higher management, meaning they lacked the independent judgment required for supervisory status. The Board ordered a representation election, which the Union won, and subsequently ordered Allied Universal to bargain. Allied Universal refused to bargain, leading the Board to issue a complaint and grant summary judgment against the company. Allied Universal then petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review, challenging both the constitutionality of the Board's procedures and the substantive finding that the lieutenants were not supervisors.
The court addressed two primary arguments raised by Allied Universal. First, regarding the constitutional challenge, the court held that the NLRB's structure did not violate the Due Process Clause. The court explained that the Fifth Amendment guarantees an opportunity to be heard, not a specific procedural form. Because Allied Universal had the opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and challenge the regional director's decision, the delegation of the hearing to a hearing officer and the decision to the regional director was constitutionally permissible. The court noted that Congress has long authorized the Board to delegate these functions. Second, the court addressed the standard of review following the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. While Loper Bright requires courts to review legal questions de novo without deference to agency interpretations, the court clarified that this does not alter the statutory 'substantial evidence' standard for reviewing factual findings. The determination of whether an employee is a supervisor is a question of fact. The court applied the substantial evidence standard, asking whether the record contained relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion. The court found that the regional director's conclusion was supported by the record. The evidence showed that the lieutenants were bound by a detailed disciplinary grid (Policy 1308) and that their decisions were subject to review and correction by captains and the project manager. Because the lieutenants did not exercise independent judgment but rather applied routine, clerical directives, they did not meet the statutory definition of a supervisor under 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
The decision enforces the NLRB's order requiring Allied Universal to collectively bargain with the lieutenants. It reinforces the principle that detailed company policies and supervisory oversight can negate independent judgment, preventing employees from being classified as supervisors. The ruling clarifies that post-Loper Bright, courts must still defer to agency factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, even while reviewing legal questions independently. The case is remanded to the Board to enforce the bargaining order, and Allied Universal must now negotiate with the union for the lieutenants.
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