11th Cir.

Lauren Woods v. Progressive American Insurance Company

November 17, 2025 ·9:19-cv-80517-BER ·Published ·Covington, District Judge · By Raj Patel

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court judgment for an insurance company in a statutory bad faith case, ruling that evidentiary exclusions did not prejudice the plaintiff. The court held that a prior jury verdict establishing excess damages was irrelevant to the jury's determination of whether the insurer acted in bad faith.

Lauren Woods sued Progressive American Insurance Company under Florida Statute § 624.155(1)(b), alleging that the insurer acted in bad faith by failing to settle her underinsured motorist claim. After a jury trial on the underlying insurance claim, Woods was awarded $545,760, which exceeded her $300,000 policy limit. Following that judgment, Woods proceeded with her statutory bad faith claim. Before the bad faith trial, the parties stipulated that a magistrate judge would decide damages and agreed to include the underlying verdict in the joint exhibit list. However, Woods later narrowed her bad faith theory to cover only Progressive's conduct before the underlying trial began and sought to exclude Progressive's internal claims notes. She also requested to introduce the underlying jury verdict and excess judgment to the bad faith jury, arguing they were relevant to the totality of the circumstances. The district court excluded the verdict and judgment, ruling they were irrelevant to the liability question and that the excess judgment was a damages issue already assigned to the magistrate. The jury found for Progressive, and Woods appealed, claiming the evidentiary rulings prevented her from proving bad faith.

The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. The court explained that under Florida law, a statutory bad faith claim requires a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine if an insurer acted fairly and honestly. The court clarified that while an excess judgment serves as a measure of damages in a bad faith action, it is not substantive evidence of bad faith conduct itself. The court noted that Woods had stipulated that the magistrate judge would decide damages, rendering the excess judgment irrelevant to the jury's task of determining liability. Furthermore, by narrowing her bad faith theory to conduct occurring before the underlying trial, Woods severed the connection between the insurer's actions and the subsequent verdict. The court reasoned that admitting the verdict would have confused the jury by implying that a later finding of liability automatically constituted bad faith, a premise rejected by the Florida Supreme Court. The court also addressed the parties' stipulations, noting that while courts generally hold parties to their stipulations, the district court has discretion to disregard them to prevent manifest injustice. Here, the court found no injustice in excluding the verdict because it was irrelevant to the limited issue of liability and its admission would have been unfairly prejudicial given Woods' attempt to exclude Progressive's evidence regarding the underlying trial.

This decision reinforces that a plaintiff in a first-party bad faith case must prove the insurer's conduct was unreasonable based on the information available at the time, not merely that the insurer lost the underlying liability trial. It clarifies that a prior excess judgment is a damages metric, not a liability shortcut, and that parties may be held to the scope of their stipulations regarding the temporal limits of bad faith conduct. The case is remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the defendant, and the legal standard for admissibility of prior verdicts in bad faith trials remains tied to the specific issues of liability and damages being tried.