Jerome Miller, Jr. pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the district court applied an enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, or ACCA, because it found Miller had three prior convictions for serious drug offenses. These prior convictions were for the delivery of cocaine under Florida law in 2017. The government argued the enhancement was proper because, by the time Miller was convicted in state court, Florida had removed ioflupane from its definition of cocaine, matching the federal definition. Miller objected, arguing that the ACCA enhancement should be based on the law in effect when he committed the offenses, when Florida law still included ioflupane as a form of cocaine, making the state statute broader than federal law.
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether Miller's prior convictions qualified as serious drug offenses under the categorical approach. This approach requires comparing the elements of the state offense to the federal definition, looking only at the statute and not the specific facts of the defendant's conduct. The court analyzed the definition of a controlled substance under the federal Controlled Substances Act, which excludes ioflupane, versus Florida law, which included ioflupane in its definition of cocaine at the time Miller committed the offenses in February and March 2017. The court addressed the timing of the legal comparison, citing Supreme Court precedents McNeill v. United States and Brown v. United States. While Brown generally directs courts to look at the federal schedules in effect when the state offense was committed, McNeill clarifies that when state law changes between the commission of the offense and the conviction, courts must look to the version of state law that applied to the offense based on state saving provisions. The court found that Florida's constitution contained a saving provision stating that amendments to criminal statutes do not affect prosecution for crimes previously committed. Therefore, the version of Florida law in effect when Miller committed the offenses controlled, not the version in effect when he was convicted. Because that version of Florida law was broader than federal law by including ioflupane, the convictions did not qualify as serious drug offenses under the ACCA.
Miller's sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded to the district court for resentencing without the ACCA enhancement. This decision clarifies that for ACCA enhancements, courts must apply state saving provisions to determine which version of state law governs when the law changes between the commission of the offense and the conviction. It limits the application of the ACCA enhancement in cases where state drug laws are broader than federal law at the time the underlying conduct occurred.