Eduardo Ulises Martinez, an art dealer with over 30 years of experience, was stopped at Miami International Airport by Customs and Border Protection after a tip from a confidential informant. Agents found three pieces of ivory in his luggage, which Martinez initially claimed were porcelain but later admitted were likely ivory, asserting they were over 100 years old. During a subsequent interview, Martinez admitted he knew he was required to declare the ivory but failed to do so. Investigations at his home and business revealed 22 additional sculptures containing ivory. He was indicted on counts of smuggling goods into and out of the United States and obstructing justice. At trial, the district court excluded evidence regarding the antique and de minimis exceptions to the ivory trade, ruling that the crime was the failure to declare, not the illegal importation itself. Martinez was convicted on most counts and sentenced to 51 months in prison.
The Eleventh Circuit addressed three primary issues. First, regarding the exclusion of evidence on antique and de minimis exceptions, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The smuggling statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 545 and 554, criminalize the knowing and fraudulent failure to declare goods. The court reasoned that the obligation to declare is mandatory and independent of whether the items are ultimately legal to import. As the court noted, 'one bringing goods into the country who fails to properly declare or present the goods as required… violates 18 U.S.C. § 545, whether importation of the merchandise was legal or illegal.' Therefore, evidence suggesting the items were exempt from import bans was irrelevant to the charge of smuggling undeclared goods. Second, the court rejected Martinez's argument under the rule of completeness (Rule 106) that he should have been allowed to introduce more of his interview. While some excluded statements might have provided context, the court found any error harmless because the government presented ample evidence of Martinez's knowledge of the declaration requirements and his intent to smuggle. Third, the court affirmed the obstruction of justice conviction, finding sufficient evidence that Martinez attempted to influence a witness by asking him to misrepresent the purpose of an invoice. Finally, regarding sentencing, the court upheld the valuation of unsold statues. Because the market for ivory is volatile and restricted, the district court was permitted to use Martinez's own listing prices as a reliable estimate of fair market value, rather than requiring comparable sales of identical items.
This decision clarifies that the duty to declare wildlife subject to CITES is absolute and cannot be bypassed by a self-diagnosis of an exemption. It reinforces that smuggling charges focus on the concealment and failure to declare, not the ultimate legality of the goods. For sentencing in wildlife cases, the ruling provides that when market value is difficult to ascertain due to regulatory restrictions, a defendant's own asking prices are a valid basis for valuation. The case is remanded for enforcement of the 51-month sentence and three years of supervised release.