Clemente Javier Aguirre-Jarquin was convicted in 2006 and sentenced to death for the murders of his neighbors, Cheryl Williams and Carol Bareis, based largely on latent print evidence identifying him as the source of prints on a murder weapon. Over the next decade, the foundation of his conviction crumbled when an internal investigation revealed a pattern of misconduct in the Seminole County Latent Print Unit, including the examiner's failure to properly verify identifications. Post-conviction DNA testing and the victim's daughter's confession led the State of Florida to drop all charges in 2018. Aguirre subsequently sued the lead investigator, the crime scene analyst, and the latent print examiner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging fabrication of evidence, malicious prosecution, and a biased investigation. The District Court denied the officers qualified immunity on most counts, leading to this interlocutory appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Tjoflat, addressed three primary issues regarding qualified immunity. First, on Count I (fabrication of evidence), the court held that the law was clearly established that fabricating inculpatory evidence violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The court reasoned that a positive latent print identification requires two steps: comparison and verification. By intentionally selecting a known incompetent verifier to bypass proper protocols, the examiner's conduct was not mere error but a fabrication of a forensic result. A reasonable jury could find this violated clearly established rights, so qualified immunity was denied. Second, on Count III (malicious prosecution), the court reversed the denial of immunity. Applying the 'arguable probable cause' standard, the court excised the fabricated print evidence and the footwear impression conclusion from the arrest affidavit. Even without these, the affidavit contained sufficient evidence: the murder weapon was found in Aguirre's yard, he had blood on his clothes and shoes, he had a history of uninvited entries into the victims' home, and he lied to investigators about his whereabouts. The court held that the existence of alternative suspects did not negate arguable probable cause. Third, on Count IV (inadequate investigation), the court reversed the denial of immunity. The court clarified that while officers must conduct a reasonable investigation, clearly established law does not require them to eliminate all doubts about a suspect or pursue every exculpatory lead before arrest. Because the officers did not harbor significant doubts about Aguirre's culpability, no constitutional right was violated. Finally, regarding state-law immunity for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court affirmed the District Court's denial, finding a factual dispute over whether the officers acted with 'wanton and willful disregard' for human rights by failing to investigate the primary alternative suspect.
The decision allows Aguirre's lawsuit to proceed against the latent print examiner and the investigators regarding the state-law claim for emotional distress, as factual disputes remain on those counts. However, the investigators are shielded from liability for the federal claims of malicious prosecution and inadequate investigation. The case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings on the remaining claims.