Nigel Richardson orchestrated two armed robberies of food delivery drivers in Florida by placing delivery orders and ambushing the drivers at a residential address. He was charged with two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, two counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. After a jury trial, Richardson was convicted on all counts. On appeal, he raised four main arguments: that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence, that the indictment for the felon-in-possession count violated the Grand Jury Clause by failing to allege he knew of his status, that the evidence was insufficient to prove he possessed a firearm, and that the exclusion of psychiatric evidence violated his right to a fair trial.
The court addressed each argument sequentially. First, regarding the brandishing counts, the court applied the categorical approach to determine if Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. Relying on its precedent in In re Saint Fleur and United States v. Solomon, the court held that completed Hobbs Act robbery requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, making it a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. section 924(c)(3)(A). The court clarified that the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor, which limited the residual clause, did not disturb the holding that completed robbery qualifies under the elements clause. Second, concerning the Grand Jury Clause, the court analyzed the indictment's language. It found that the phrase 'did so knowingly' naturally modified the preceding elements, including the defendant's status as a felon. The court rejected Richardson's comparison to United States v. Martinez, noting that unlike the indictment in Martinez, this one clearly alleged knowledge of the status element. Third, on sufficiency of evidence, the court found that lay testimony from the victims describing a weapon that 'appeared' real was sufficient to establish the object was a firearm. Furthermore, photographic evidence showing Richardson holding a Hi-Point C9 handgun two days before the robbery, corroborated by expert testimony identifying the gun's unique features, supported the finding that he possessed the firearm. Finally, regarding the psychiatric evidence, the court held that the exclusion of Dr. Du Bois's evaluation did not violate due process. The evaluation assessed Richardson's competency in 2020, not his mental state regarding his felon status in 2018. Additionally, the evidence was inculpatory as it showed Richardson remembered his prior convictions, and the charge was a general-intent offense where such evidence is generally inadmissible to negate mens rea.
The decision reaffirms the Eleventh Circuit's precedent that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a predicate crime of violence for section 924(c) enhancements, ensuring that defendants convicted of such robberies face mandatory firearm penalties. It clarifies that indictments for felon-in-possession charges need not explicitly cite section 924(a)(2) if the language 'did so knowingly' is used, as this satisfies the Grand Jury Clause requirement for alleging knowledge of status. The ruling also solidifies that lay testimony regarding the appearance of a weapon, supported by circumstantial evidence of possession, is sufficient to sustain firearm convictions even when the physical weapon is not recovered.