Joaquin Herrera Avila, a native and citizen of Mexico, was apprehended in Minneapolis in August 2025 for lacking legal documents authorizing his admission into the United States. DHS detained Avila without bond and initiated removal proceedings against him. Avila had previously entered the country illegally in 2006 and 2016. After an immigration judge denied his request for a bond redetermination hearing, Avila filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court. The district court granted the petition, ruling that Avila was not 'seeking admission' because he had lived in the country for years without seeking lawful status. The district court ordered the government to either release Avila or conduct a bond hearing within seven days. The government appealed, challenging the district court's interpretation of the statutory authority to detain unadmitted aliens in the interior.
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the statutory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) and § 1225(b)(2)(A) de novo. The court focused on the relationship between the terms 'applicant for admission' and 'seeking admission.' Under § 1225(a)(1), an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted is deemed an 'applicant for admission.' The majority held that the ordinary meaning of 'seeking admission' is equivalent to 'applicant for admission.' Citing dictionary definitions, the court reasoned that to 'apply' is to 'make a formal request' and to 'seek' is to 'request' or 'ask for.' Therefore, a person who applies for something is necessarily seeking it. The court analogized this to a college applicant who is 'seeking admission' as long as their application is pending, even if they take no further affirmative steps. The court rejected Avila's argument that 'seeking admission' requires present-tense, affirmative action, noting that such a reading would render the phrase superfluous. The court also addressed the argument that this interpretation would make the Laken Riley Act (§ 1226(c)) redundant. The court explained that § 1226(c) applies to a broader group of aliens, including those who were previously admitted but lost status, and imposes different penalties, so the statutes do not conflict. Furthermore, the court dismissed reliance on legislative history and prior administrative practices, stating that the statutory text is clear and that the failure of previous administrations to exercise full authority does not limit the statutory grant of power. The court distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, noting that it did not address this specific interpretive issue. Consequently, the court found that Avila, as an unadmitted alien present in the interior, was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The decision expands the government's authority to detain unadmitted aliens without bond hearings while they are in the interior of the United States, not just at the border. The case is remanded to the district court for proceedings consistent with the Eighth Circuit's opinion, meaning the government may continue to detain Avila without bond pending his removal proceedings. The ruling creates a circuit split with the Seventh Circuit's preliminary view and aligns the Eighth Circuit with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi. It leaves open the question of whether due process considerations might still limit detention in specific circumstances, as noted in the dissent's reference to recent district court rulings.
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