Two U.S. citizens petitioned for immigrant visas on behalf of their relatives, who were subsequently placed in administrative processing by the Department of State. After waiting sixteen and seven months respectively, the petitioners filed complaints in the District Court alleging unreasonable delay. The district court dismissed both complaints for failure to state a claim, applying the factors from Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC. While the petitioners appealed these dismissals, the Department of State concluded the administrative processing: one applicant received a visa and entered the country, while the other was denied a visa due to alleged terrorist activity. The petitioners argued the Department had tactically mooted the cases to avoid judicial review.
Senior Circuit Judge Ginsburg wrote for the panel, explaining that Article III limits federal courts to adjudicating actual, ongoing controversies. A case becomes moot when an intervening event prevents the court from granting any effectual relief. The court identified two principal exceptions to mootness: voluntary cessation of challenged activity and the capability of repetition yet evading review. For the applicant who received a visa, the court found no effectual relief could be granted. The court rejected the voluntary-cessation exception because the Department demonstrated it was absolutely clear the delay would not recur, noting the applicant would not need a visa for reentry unless he left for over a year or lost his status. The court also found no evidence of manipulative conduct, citing the Department's desire for an expeditious ruling. For the applicant denied a visa, the court found the case moot because the denial was based on statutory inadmissibility for terrorist activities, meaning a future application would likely be refused immediately without significant processing delay. The court declined to create a new exception for unreasonable delay claims.
The appeals are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The district court judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot. This decision reinforces that the voluntary-cessation exception requires evidence of jurisdictional manipulation and that the capability of repetition exception does not apply when the underlying denial is based on permanent statutory bars.