Federal Narrative Summaries · July 8, 2026
Case Explained: SMITH V. AIRBNB, INC.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-08 Docket: 2:23-cv-02541-SMM The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Airbnb Inc.'s motion to dismiss Alex Smith's complaint and its denial of leave to amend. The court held that...
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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed: 2026-07-08
Docket: 2:23-cv-02541-SMM
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of Airbnb Inc.’s motion to dismiss Alex Smith’s complaint and its denial of leave to amend. The court held that Smith failed to state a claim under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), because his Second Amended Complaint did not plausibly allege facts establishing that his registration and use of the domain name <airbnbseo.com> was not unlawful. In applying the ACPA standard, the court determined that Smith bore the burden to plead sufficient facts to create a plausible inference that at least one element of cybersquatting liability was not met. The court found Smith’s pleading deficient on two grounds: confusing similarity and bad faith intent. First, regarding confusing similarity, the court applied the standard that a domain name is confusingly similar if it is so similar in sight, sound, or meaning to a famous mark that confusion is likely. The court treated the “AIRBNB” mark as famous based on Smith’s own allegations of its high visibility and his admission that he selected the domain name for that reason. Consequently, the court ruled that adding the merely descriptive term “SEO” to the famous “AIRBNB” mark rendered <airbnbseo.com> confusingly similar as a matter of law, noting that the *Sleekcraft* factors are a poor fit in this context. Second, regarding bad faith intent, the court found that Smith’s intentional use of a famous mark to leverage Airbnb’s brand for commercial purposes constituted bad faith under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i). The court rejected Smith’s arguments for nominative fair use, statutory fair use, and the ACPA safe harbor provision, concluding that his use implicated the source-identification function of trademarks and was not a case of ignorance or parody. Because the ACPA claims failed, the court also affirmed the dismissal of Smith’s state law unjust enrichment claim and his request for injunctive relief. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend, as Smith offered only vague generalities without proffering specific additional facts that would cure the pleading deficiencies regarding confusing similarity or bad faith. The practical consequence is that the dismissal stands with prejudice, barring Smith from re-filing the same claims based on the current record.
Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.
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