4th Cir.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MARY ELIZABETH WORKMAN

April 21, 2026 ·25-4507 ·Per Curiam · By James Taylor

The Fourth Circuit affirmed a defendant's resentencing, rejecting her claim that the increased sentence resulted from judicial vindictiveness. The court held that because a different judge imposed the new sentence, the presumption of retaliatory motivation does not apply, and the defendant failed to prove actual animus.

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Mary Elizabeth Workman pleaded guilty to theft of government property and received an initial sentence. She successfully appealed that conviction, leading to a remand for resentencing. Upon remand, a different district court judge imposed an 18-month sentence, which was three months longer than her original term, and added additional conditions to her supervised release. Workman appealed, arguing that the increased sentence and new conditions were a vindictive punishment for her successful first appeal.

The court analyzed the legal standards for judicial vindictiveness under the Due Process Clause. While a defendant is entitled to a sentence free from vindictiveness, the law provides two paths to prove it: actual vindictiveness or a rebuttable presumption. The presumption applies when the same judge imposes a more severe sentence after a successful appeal. However, citing Alabama v. Smith, the court explained that this presumption does not apply when a different judge imposes the new sentence. A second decisionmaker lacks the personal stake in the prior conviction necessary to infer retaliatory motivation. Consequently, the burden remains on the defendant to prove actual vindictiveness. The court noted that Workman did not object to the sentence on these grounds at the district court, so her appeal was reviewed for plain error. Under this standard, she had to show a clear error that seriously affected the fairness of the proceedings. The record showed the new judge gave clear reasons for the increased sentence, considering the entire record, the nature of the offense, and Workman's medical and mental health history. There was no evidence of animus.

Workman's 18-month sentence and additional supervised release conditions remain in effect. The decision clarifies that defendants challenging resentencing by a new judge must provide direct evidence of judicial animus rather than relying on a presumption of vindictiveness. It reinforces that increased sentences on remand are permissible when justified by objective information concerning conduct subsequent to the original trial.

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