Mario Santiago-Sarabia, a native and citizen of Mexico, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's order. The immigration judge had denied Santiago-Sarabia's applications for cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. The denial was based on the finding that his criminal history, which included two DUI convictions in 2010 and 2013, a third DUI conviction in 2014, and a fourth DUI arrest in 2018 while a criminal charge was pending, demonstrated a lack of 'good moral character' under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). The government had issued him a notice to appear after his initial convictions, and he continued to face DUI charges while his immigration proceedings were ongoing.
The court addressed several legal arguments raised by the petitioner. First, regarding the vagueness challenge, the court reasoned that while the 'good moral character' catchall provision might raise concerns in the abstract, it is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Santiago-Sarabia. The court emphasized that drunk driving is universally criminalized in the United States and creates a significant risk of harm to innocent bystanders. Citing Attorney General precedent and Supreme Court authority, the court noted a national consensus that impaired driving is unacceptable conduct that imposes intolerable harms on society. Consequently, the petitioner had 'fair notice' that his four arrests and convictions reflected poorly on his character, and the agency's decision was not 'so standardless' as to constitute arbitrary enforcement. Second, the court declined to reach the petitioner's facial vagueness challenge because his as-applied challenge failed, noting that no 'exceptional circumstances' justified addressing the facial claim. The court distinguished the 'good moral character' standard from the problematic 'shades of red' language in prior cases, explaining that the enumerated categories in the statute vary in degree but not in kind. Third, the court rejected the argument that the statute violates the non-delegation doctrine, stating that the 'good moral character' standard provides an 'intelligible principle' and satisfies the 'exceedingly modest limitation' imposed by the doctrine. Fourth, the court dismissed the petitioner's narrow construction argument that DUI convictions are merely a 'near miss' from the 'habitual drunkard' category, explaining that Congress could not have intended that persons committing heinous acts falling short of legal definitions of specific crimes necessarily possess good moral character. Finally, the court held that the BIA permissibly applied the precedent set in Matter of Castillo-Perez retroactively. Applying the five-factor test from Montgomery Ward, the court found that three of the four applicable factors supported retroactive application, including the lack of an abrupt departure from established practice and the government's interest in uniform application. The court also affirmed the BIA's refusal to consider the voluntary departure claim, noting that the petitioner's notice of appeal only challenged the denial of cancellation of removal.
The decision affirms the denial of cancellation of removal and voluntary departure for Santiago-Sarabia, leaving the BIA's order in effect. The ruling clarifies that the 'good moral character' catchall provision is enforceable against individuals with multiple DUI convictions, even if those convictions do not strictly fit the 'habitual drunkard' category. It also confirms that the BIA may retroactively apply the Castillo-Perez presumption regarding good moral character in cases where the petitioner's conduct clearly reflects poorly on their character. The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.
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