11th Cir.

United States v. Hemley

May 11, 2026 ·6:24-cr-00091-WWB-NWH-6 ·Per Curiam · By James Taylor

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a forty-six-month sentence for conspiracy to defraud the United States and aiding in the preparation of false tax returns. The court held that the district court did not commit plain error in explaining its sentence or abuse its discretion in selecting a below-guidelines term.

Background

Adon O. Hemley was sentenced to forty-six months for conspiracy to defraud the United States under Section eighteen of the United States Code, Section three hundred seventy-one, and aiding in the preparation of false tax returns under Section twenty-six of the United States Code, Section seven two zero six, paragraph two. Hemley appealed, arguing the district court procedurally erred by failing to adequately explain its sentence and by not affording adequate consideration to his low risk of recidivism.

The court’s reasoning

The court applied a two-step process, first reviewing for procedural reasonableness and then for substantive reasonableness. Because Hemley did not object to the explanation of the sentence below, the court reviewed that claim for plain error. The court found the district court’s reasoning was clear on the face of the record, noting several Section thirty-five hundred fifty-three, paragraph a factors. Regarding substantive reasonableness, the court held that the district court is not required to expressly mention every mitigating factor if it has reviewed the presentence investigation report and character letters. The sentence was well below the statutory maximum and the guideline range, indicating it was within the ballpark of permissible outcomes.

What it means going forward

The decision reinforces that a sentencing court’s general acknowledgment of Section thirty-five hundred fifty-three factors and review of the record is sufficient to rebut claims of plain error regarding the explanation of a sentence. It also clarifies that failure to explicitly discuss specific mitigating evidence does not constitute an abuse of discretion if the court considered the totality of the circumstances.