2nd Cir.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. GHISLAINE MAXWELL

March 12, 2024 ·22-1426-cr ·Panel Decision ·José A. Cabranes · By James Taylor

The Second Circuit affirmed Ghislaine Maxwell's conviction and sentence for sex trafficking and related offenses involving minors. The court rejected Maxwell's arguments that a prior non-prosecution agreement barred her prosecution, that the indictment was untimely, and that jury misconduct or improper instructions warranted a new trial.

Ghislaine Maxwell was convicted in the Southern District of New York of conspiracy to transport minors, transportation of a minor, and sex trafficking of a minor. The charges stemmed from her role in facilitating Jeffrey Epstein's sexual abuse of underage girls between 1994 and 2004. Maxwell appealed her conviction and sentence, raising five primary legal challenges. She argued that a 2007 non-prosecution agreement (NPA) between Epstein and federal prosecutors in Florida immunized her from prosecution in New York. She also contended that the indictment was time-barred, that a juror's undisclosed history of sexual abuse violated her Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, that the district court's handling of a jury note improperly amended the charges, and that her sentence was procedurally unreasonable.

The Second Circuit addressed each of Maxwell's arguments sequentially. First, regarding the non-prosecution agreement, the court held that the NPA negotiated by the Southern District of Florida did not bind the Southern District of New York. Citing United States v. Annabi, the court reasoned that plea agreements bind only the specific U.S. Attorney's office that enters them unless there is affirmative evidence that the agreement was intended to bind other districts. The text of the NPA was limited to the Southern District of Florida, and there was no evidence that the Southern District of New York had approved or was notified of the agreement. Second, the court addressed the statute of limitations. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3283, as amended by the PROTECT Act in 2003, applies retroactively to offenses committed before its enactment. The statutory text clearly indicated Congress's intent to extend the time to prosecute sexual abuse of minors, and the charged offenses involved the sexual abuse of a minor, satisfying the statute's requirements. Third, concerning the juror's conduct, the court applied the standard from McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood. Maxwell needed to show that the juror failed to answer honestly and that a correct response would have provided a basis for a challenge for cause. The district court found the juror's error to be an inadvertent mistake and credible, and the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in denying the new trial motion. Fourth, the court rejected the claim of constructive amendment. The jury's note regarding the transportation element was ambiguous, but the district court's response directing the jury to the relevant instruction did not alter the essential elements of the offense or the core of criminality charged in the indictment. Finally, regarding sentencing, the court found the district court's application of the leadership enhancement and its explanation of the above-Guidelines sentence were procedurally reasonable, noting that the Guidelines are advisory and the district court properly considered the statutory factors.

The decision affirms Maxwell's conviction and sentence, leaving her with a 240-month prison term followed by supervised release. It clarifies that non-prosecution agreements are generally district-specific and do not create a national immunity for co-conspirators absent explicit language. The ruling also confirms the retroactive application of the extended statute of limitations for child sexual abuse offenses and reinforces the high bar for overturning verdicts based on juror misconduct or jury communications.