Ariel Marcelo Bastias, a Chilean national and lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty in 2019 to violating Florida Statute § 827.03(2)(d). This statute criminalizes the willful or culpably negligent neglect of a child without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement. Following his conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that Bastias's state offense fell within the category of 'a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment' under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which renders aliens deportable. The Immigration Judge agreed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, relying on prior interpretations that broadly define 'crime of child abuse' to include offenses involving criminally negligent acts that impair a child's well-being, even without actual injury. Bastias appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which initially denied his petition in 2022 based on deference to the Board under the Chevron framework. However, the Supreme Court vacated that decision in 2024 following its ruling in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overruled Chevron and required courts to exercise independent judgment in statutory interpretation. The case returned to the Eleventh Circuit for reconsideration.
The court addressed the case on remand by first determining whether its prior decision in Pierre v. U.S. Attorney General remained binding precedent despite the overruling of Chevron. Judge Newsom, writing for the majority, concluded that the Eleventh Circuit is bound by the holding in Pierre under the doctrine of statutory stare decisis. Although Pierre relied on Chevron deference to accept the Board's broad interpretation of 'crime of child abuse,' the Supreme Court in Loper Bright explicitly preserved the holdings of prior cases that relied on Chevron, stating that mere reliance on Chevron is not a special justification for overruling a statutory precedent. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit must apply the interpretation of the INA adopted in Pierre, which defines 'crime of child abuse' to include offenses involving intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent acts that constitute maltreatment, even if no actual injury occurs. Applying this binding interpretation to Bastias's case, the court found a categorical match. The Florida statute requires 'culpable negligence,' which the court noted is defined by Florida law as conduct evincing reckless disregard for human life or an entire want of care. This mental state satisfies the federal requirement of recklessness or higher. Furthermore, the state statute criminalizes conduct that could reasonably be expected to result in serious physical or mental injury, matching the federal requirement that the offense involve a risk of harm. Consequently, the court held that Bastias's conviction falls within the deportable category.
The decision confirms that lawful permanent residents convicted of Florida child neglect offenses involving culpable negligence are subject to deportation under the INA. It establishes that the Eleventh Circuit's prior interpretation of 'crime of child abuse' remains good law following Loper Bright, effectively insulating the Board's broad definition from challenge in this circuit. The ruling clarifies that actual physical injury is not a prerequisite for deportability; the creation of a substantial risk of harm combined with culpable negligence is sufficient. The decision leaves open the question of whether other circuits might reach different conclusions regarding the scope of 'crime of child abuse' absent binding precedent, but within the Eleventh Circuit, the path for removal based on this specific state conviction is closed.