1st Cir.

ALEJANDRA MILAGROS DE LA CRUZ-QUISPE v. PAMELA J. BONDI Attorney General

December 5, 2025 ·25-1421 ·Panel Decision ·Lynch, Circuit Judge · By Raj Patel

The First Circuit denied a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision rejecting an asylum claim based on domestic violence. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency's finding that the petitioner's abuser was motivated by personal relationship disputes rather than her membership in a protected social group.

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Alejandra Milagros De La Cruz-Quispe, a native of Peru, entered the United States without valid documents in 2013 and later sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. She alleged that her former partner, Mauro, subjected her to years of severe physical and sexual abuse, including beatings, forced sex, and threats of death, often motivated by his desire to control her. De La Cruz argued that this violence was persecution on account of her membership in various particular social groups, such as Peruvian women unable to leave a domestic relationship or women viewed as property. The Immigration Judge denied her applications, finding that while the abuse was real, it was driven by Mauro's personal relationship to her rather than a protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed this decision, and De La Cruz petitioned the First Circuit for review.

The First Circuit focused its analysis on the 'nexus requirement,' which mandates that an asylum applicant prove a causal connection between the harm suffered and a statutorily protected ground, such as race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. The court reiterated that where multiple motives exist for persecution, the protected ground must be 'at least one central reason' for the harm, not merely incidental or tangential. The court reviewed the BIA's factual findings under the 'substantial evidence standard,' a highly deferential test that requires the court to uphold the agency's decision unless the record compels a contrary conclusion. The court found that the record, largely consisting of De La Cruz's own testimony, demonstrated that Mauro's abuse arose from 'intensely personal disputes within the relationship.' The court noted that the evidence did not compel a finding that the scope of the persecution extended beyond a 'personal vendetta.' Consequently, the court held that the BIA did not clearly err in concluding that the petitioner failed to establish the required nexus. Because the nexus requirement is dispositive for asylum, the court also affirmed the denial of withholding of removal, which requires a higher showing of a clear probability of future persecution on a protected ground. Regarding the Convention Against Torture claim, the court explained that while a nexus to a protected ground is not required, the petitioner must show it is more likely than not that she will be tortured by or with the acquiescence of a government official. The court found substantial evidence supporting the BIA's determination that De La Cruz's fear of future torture was 'purely speculative,' as she testified she did not know her abuser's current whereabouts and offered no evidence that the Peruvian government would acquiesce in his actions.

The petition for review is denied, meaning the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision to deny asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection stands. De La Cruz remains subject to removal to Peru. The decision reinforces the First Circuit's precedent that domestic violence claims must carefully establish that the abuser's motivation was tied to a protected ground rather than personal animosity. It also highlights the evidentiary burden for CAT claims, requiring specific proof of government acquiescence or inability to protect, which was not met in this case due to the speculative nature of the petitioner's fear regarding her abuser's future actions.

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