Markanthony Harris, a prisoner at Kettle Moraine Correctional Institution in Wisconsin, sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his due process rights during disciplinary proceedings. After receiving a conduct report for possessing synthetic cannabinoids and associating with a gang, Harris waived a hearing for the first incident but requested one for a second incident involving distribution of contraband. During the second hearing, officials denied his requests to call two prisoner witnesses and to see statements from confidential informants, citing safety risks and cumulative testimony. Harris was found guilty and sentenced to 90 days of disciplinary segregation. Following the hearing, he was transferred to Green Bay Correctional Institution, a maximum-security facility, where he claimed he faced harsher conditions and delays in accessing substance abuse and job training programs. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that the discipline imposed did not deprive Harris of a protected liberty interest.
The Seventh Circuit analyzed whether the prison officials' actions deprived Harris of a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court first addressed the transfer to a maximum-security prison. Citing Wilkinson v. Austin and Holleman v. Zatecky, the court reaffirmed that a prisoner does not have a protected liberty interest in their assignment to a particular prison, regardless of the conditions. The court also noted that Harris did not dispute he requested the transfer, rendering his due process claim regarding the transfer frivolous. Next, the court considered Harris's argument that the transfer delayed his access to rehabilitative programs. Relying on Zimmerman v. Tribble, the court held that the denial of access to educational, rehabilitative, or vocational programs does not implicate a protected liberty interest. The court further observed that Harris remained on the waitlist for these programs and could still complete them at the new facility. Finally, because the court found that neither the disciplinary segregation nor the transfer implicated a protected liberty interest, it declined to address whether the denial of witnesses and informant statements constituted procedurally deficient hearings. The court emphasized that a due process claim requires both a deprivation of a liberty interest and constitutionally deficient procedures.
This decision reinforces the high threshold for prisoners to claim a liberty interest in prison discipline, limiting due process protections to situations involving atypical and significant hardships. It clarifies that transfers between facilities and delays in accessing rehabilitative programs do not trigger due process rights. Prison officials may continue to deny witness testimony and informant statements in disciplinary hearings without facing liability, provided the resulting discipline does not rise to the level of an atypical and significant hardship. The case was affirmed with no remand instructions.
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