7th Cir.

SHAREEF CHILDS v. CHERYL WEBSTER, et al

March 4, 2026 ·24-1817 ·Panel Decision ·BRENNAN, Chief Judge · By Aisha Johnson

The Seventh Circuit held that a prison's refusal to provide accurate prayer schedules does not violate RLUIPA or the Free Exercise Clause when inmates can obtain them through donations or purchase. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that the de minimis cost of buying a schedule does not constitute a substantial burden on religious exercise.

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Shareef Childs, a practicing Muslim inmate at Stanley Correctional Institution in Wisconsin, sued prison officials alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. Childs relied on prayer schedules to determine the precise times for his five daily prayers, believing that missing the correct window was a major sin. In early 2023, a chaplain distributed prayer schedules that were inaccurate due to an entry error. When Childs requested accurate schedules, the chaplains declined, citing a policy that prohibits using taxpayer funds to purchase personal property items for inmates, though inmates could receive them via donation or purchase from outside vendors. Childs eventually received an accurate schedule via donation but sued for the period he lacked one and for the refusal to provide them in the future. The district court granted summary judgment, ruling that the prison's negligence in distributing incorrect schedules was not a constitutional violation and that RLUIPA does not require the state to subsidize religious materials.

Chief Judge Brennan, writing for the panel, analyzed the case in two parts: the RLUIPA claim and the Free Exercise claims. Under RLUIPA, the court first addressed whether the prison's policy placed a 'substantial burden' on Childs's religious exercise. The court explained that a substantial burden exists when the government forces an inmate to choose between violating their religion and incurring a severe negative consequence, such as significant financial hardship or disciplinary action. The court distinguished Childs's situation from cases like Jones v. Carter, where the cost of religiously compelled food was so high it forced the inmate to 'give away his last dime.' Here, the cost of a prayer schedule was 'de minimis' and 'unquestionably affordable,' meaning it did not create the coercive dilemma required for a substantial burden. Furthermore, the court held that RLUIPA does not require states to purchase religious items for inmates. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson, the court established that RLUIPA is designed to remove government-created burdens, not to subsidize religious activities. The statute explicitly states that nothing creates a right to receive government funding for religious activities. Therefore, the prison's refusal to use taxpayer funds to buy schedules did not violate RLUIPA. Regarding the Free Exercise claims, the court found that the prison's neutral policy against purchasing personal property was of general applicability and did not violate the First Amendment. The court also noted that Childs waived his claim regarding the initial distribution of inaccurate schedules because he failed to allege intentional or reckless conduct, which is required for a § 1983 claim. The court concluded that because the cost of obtaining a schedule was negligible and the prison did not block access to them, Childs failed to make a prima facie case of a substantial burden.

This decision clarifies that prisons are not required to purchase religious items like prayer schedules for inmates under RLUIPA or the Constitution, provided inmates have access to alternative means such as donations or outside purchases. It sets a threshold for 'substantial burden' in financial contexts, indicating that only costs that create a severe coercive dilemma, such as forcing an inmate to spend all their income, will trigger strict scrutiny. The case is remanded to the district court to enter judgment consistent with the Seventh Circuit's opinion, effectively ending Childs's claims.

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