3rd Cir.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LEKESHA HILL

March 5, 2026 ·2:23-cr-00371-001) ·Panel Decision ·SHWARTZ · By James Taylor

The Third Circuit affirmed Lekesha Hill's sixty-three-month sentence and restitution order, finding no error in the District Court's application of sentencing enhancements. The court held that the lower court correctly applied a two-level obstruction of justice enhancement and a sophisticated-means enhancement based on the facts of the case.

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Lekesha Hill, a bookkeeper, pleaded guilty to six counts of wire fraud for embezzling funds from her employer by using business credit cards for personal purchases and diverting funds through a fake PayPal account. Before her sentencing, she violated her release conditions by continuing to work as an accountant and bookkeeper, submitting false documents to conceal this employment, and lying about the purpose of a trip to Georgia. These violations led to her bail revocation and prompted the government to recommend a two-level obstruction of justice enhancement. Additionally, the District Court raised the issue of a sophisticated-means enhancement sua sponte, which Hill argued against. The District Court ultimately sentenced Hill to sixty-three months in prison, three years of supervised release, and ordered her to pay $359,383.65 in restitution.

The Third Circuit reviewed Hill's arguments for plain error since she failed to preserve them at the district court level. First, regarding the obstruction of justice enhancement, the court found that Hill's conduct met the requirements of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The guidelines allow a two-level increase when a defendant willfully obstructs the administration of justice by providing materially false information to a probation officer. Hill admitted to submitting false employment and bank records to Pretrial Services and Probation to hide her accounting work. The court reasoned that because a statement to a probation officer regarding financial resources affects the determination of ability to pay fines or restitution, Hill's deception was material. Her intent to mislead the authorities about her income source constituted willful obstruction, and the court noted that this conduct also precluded her from receiving an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. Second, the court addressed the sophisticated-means enhancement. Although Hill did not argue whether the enhancement applied, she challenged the court's sua sponte consideration of it. The court held that the District Court did not violate party-presentation principles because it had notified the parties two months in advance and provided them an opportunity to brief and argue the issue before sentencing. This process distinguished the case from precedents where courts raised issues without notice. Finally, the court upheld the restitution order. Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, courts must order restitution for the full amount of victim losses. Since Hill had acknowledged the restitution figure during her plea and failed to dispute the presentence report's findings at sentencing, the District Court acted within its discretion to rely on those figures.

The decision affirms the sentence and restitution order, meaning Hill must serve the sixty-three-month term and pay the full restitution amount. The ruling clarifies that providing false financial information to probation officers regarding employment status constitutes material obstruction of justice. It also reinforces that district courts may sua sponte consider sentencing enhancements if the parties are given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard, ensuring that the party-presentation principle is not violated.

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