Fed. Cir.

THE TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK v. GEN DIGITAL INC

March 11, 2026 ·24-1244 ·Panel Decision ·DYK, Circuit Judge · By Maria Santos

The Federal Circuit reversed a district court's finding of civil contempt against Gen Digital's counsel for refusing to disclose privileged communications. The court held that an alleged conflict of interest does not automatically terminate the attorney-client privilege, rendering the underlying disclosure order invalid.

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Columbia University sued Gen Digital, formerly Symantec, for patent infringement and sought to correct inventorship on a specific patent, the '643 patent, claiming its professors were the true inventors rather than a Gen Digital employee. During discovery, Gen Digital's counsel, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, represented a former employee, Dr. Marc Dacier, who was a potential witness. After a period of litigation and a stay, the district court found that Quinn had a conflict of interest because Dr. Dacier had expressed regret regarding Gen Digital's conduct, which allegedly voided the retainer agreement. The district court ordered Quinn to publicly disclose any privileged communications with Dr. Dacier. When Quinn refused, citing attorney-client privilege, the district court held Quinn in civil contempt and imposed a sanction: a negative inference that Dr. Dacier would have testified against Gen Digital. This negative inference was used to support an award of enhanced damages and attorneys' fees in a companion infringement case. Quinn appealed, arguing the disclosure order was invalid because it compelled the release of privileged information.

The Federal Circuit analyzed whether the district court's order requiring the disclosure of communications was a valid decree capable of supporting a contempt finding. Under Fourth Circuit law, a party cannot be held in contempt for violating an order that is not valid. The court focused on the district court's conclusion that the attorney-client privilege was automatically terminated due to Quinn's conflict of interest. The Federal Circuit rejected this legal theory, citing precedent from the D.C. Circuit and the Third Circuit which hold that a conflict of interest does not vitiate the attorney-client privilege. The court reasoned that the privilege belongs to the client and should not be defeated solely because an attorney's conduct was ethically questionable. Punishing the client by stripping them of privilege for their lawyer's impropriety would be unfair. The court noted that while a conflict may subject an attorney to disciplinary sanctions or malpractice liability, it does not automatically terminate the representation or the privilege. Furthermore, the court found that Quinn was entitled to assert the privilege on behalf of Dr. Dacier without first consulting the client to determine if the client wished to assert it. Because the Disclosure Order improperly required the production of privileged communications, it was invalid. Consequently, the Contempt Order predicated on that invalid decree could not stand.

The Federal Circuit reversed both the Disclosure Order and the Contempt Order. As a direct result, the district court's award of enhanced damages and attorneys' fees in the companion case, which relied in part on the negative inference drawn from the contempt finding, has been set aside. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, leaving the question of whether alternative sanctions for Quinn's conduct unrelated to the privileged disclosure remain open. The decision clarifies that attorneys may assert privilege on behalf of clients even in the face of alleged conflicts, and that clients do not lose privilege protections due to their counsel's ethical lapses.

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