5th Cir.

United States of America Plaintiff— v. Elijah Porter Defendant—

March 17, 2026 ·25-60163 ·Panel Decision ·Jerry E. Smith · By Aisha Johnson

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of Elijah Porter's motion to suppress evidence, holding that license plate reader data does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. The court further ruled that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and that the firearm was lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine.

Listen to this decision 0:00 / 4:15

Elijah Porter was charged with possession of a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). The case began when Officer Charles Hoggard received an alert from an automated license plate reader (LPR) system indicating that a vehicle associated with criminal activity was linked to Porter, who had an outstanding warrant for aggravated assault. Hoggard located the vehicle, stopped it, and conducted a pat-down. During the stop, he observed a firearm protruding from under the driver's seat and a silver switch on the back of it. Porter moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the LPR scan was an unconstitutional search, the stop lacked reasonable suspicion, the firearm was not in plain view, and the federal statute prohibiting machineguns violated the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion to suppress and ruled the statute constitutional, leading to Porter's bench trial conviction.

The Fifth Circuit addressed three primary issues. First, regarding the license plate reader, the court held that the use of an LPR system did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Citing United States v. Knotts, the court reasoned that a person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements from one place to another. The court distinguished LPR data from the cell-site location information at issue in Carpenter v. United States, noting that LPRs provide only periodic snapshots of a vehicle's location at specific camera stations rather than continuous, intimate tracking of a person's life. Second, the court found the traffic stop lawful. Officer Hoggard had reasonable suspicion based on the LPR alert revealing an active arrest warrant. The court clarified that a 'be on the lookout' report does not require a physical description of the driver to provide reasonable suspicion, and under the collective knowledge doctrine, the reliability of the ALPR system provided sufficient grounds for the stop. Third, regarding the firearm, the court applied the plain view doctrine. The officer testified that the barrel of the gun and the conversion switch were visible from his vantage point, and the incriminating nature of the switch was immediately apparent. The court found the district court's credibility determination regarding the officer's testimony to be sound, noting that the body camera footage did not plainly contradict the finding that the items were in plain view. Finally, the court rejected the Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). Relying on its precedent in Hollis v. Lynch and the recent decision in United States v. Wilson, the court affirmed that machineguns are 'dangerous and unusual' weapons not protected by the Second Amendment. The court noted that while Bruen reinforced the historical tradition of prohibiting such weapons, it did not overrule the specific holding that machineguns fall outside Second Amendment protection.

The decision affirms the conviction and reinforces the Fifth Circuit's precedent that license plate reader data does not trigger Fourth Amendment protections. It clarifies that law enforcement may rely on ALPR alerts to initiate stops even without a physical description of the driver. The ruling also solidifies the position that machineguns are categorically excluded from Second Amendment protection, leaving no open questions for future challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) within the circuit. The case is affirmed with no remand instructions.

Play