Harrius Johnson, an African American police officer with the Miami-Dade County Police Department, was disciplined and eventually terminated. Johnson sued the County, alleging that the real reasons for his termination were racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Florida Civil Rights Act. The District Court granted summary judgment for the County, finding that the County provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination and that Johnson failed to show these reasons were pretextual. The Eleventh Circuit previously remanded the case for reconsideration of Johnson's comparator evidence in light of the en banc decision in Lewis v. City of Union City, which clarified the standard for similarly situated comparators. On remand, the District Court applied the Lewis standard and again granted summary judgment for the County. Johnson, now proceeding pro se, appealed the second grant of summary judgment.
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court first addressed the discrimination claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. The court explained that while a failure to establish a prima facie case does not automatically mandate summary judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff must then produce a 'convincing mosaic' of circumstantial evidence to prove intentional discrimination. Johnson's claim relied heavily on comparator evidence. Under Lewis, a valid comparator must be 'similarly situated in all material respects,' meaning they must have engaged in the same basic conduct, be subject to the same policies, share the same supervisor, and have a similar disciplinary history. The court found that Johnson's proposed comparators failed this test because they lacked the extensive disciplinary history Johnson had, which included five disciplinary actions over two and a half years. The court noted that while the failure to meet the Lewis standard at the prima facie stage does not render comparator evidence irrelevant to the ultimate summary judgment inquiry, Johnson's distinguishable comparators, standing alone, did not create a convincing mosaic of discrimination. Regarding the retaliation claim, the court assumed for the sake of argument that Johnson made a prima facie case but found the County rebutted the presumption of retaliatory intent with legitimate reasons for the termination. Johnson failed to show pretext or present evidence of a retaliatory motive. His arguments regarding suspicious timing were rejected because the gap between his EEOC complaints and the disciplinary actions was approximately two months, which the court deemed too long to infer retaliation. His claims that disciplinary reports were falsified were dismissed as unsupported conjecture. Finally, the court rejected Johnson's procedural challenges regarding evidentiary rulings and discovery, noting they were either previously decided or waived under the law-of-the-case doctrine.
The decision affirms the District Court's grant of summary judgment, ending the litigation in favor of Miami-Dade County. It reinforces the strict application of the Lewis standard for comparators in the Eleventh Circuit, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that comparators share material disciplinary histories and misconduct. The ruling clarifies that while a prima facie case is not dispositive, plaintiffs must still construct a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence to survive summary judgment, and that remote timing between protected activity and adverse action is insufficient to prove pretext.