11th Cir.

Giehl v. Ocwen Financial Corporation

May 1, 2026 ·8:23-cv-00676-WFJ-CPT ·Per Curiam · By James Taylor

The Eleventh Circuit vacated a federal dismissal order and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice, clarifying that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar claims for damages against private parties in state court proceedings. The court held that the plaintiff's federal claims were wholly insubstantial because they lacked a plausible foundation in federal law and did not involve state action.

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James Giehl became the owner of a Sarasota, Florida property after winning a foreclosure auction in 2014. However, Bank of America later initiated a separate foreclosure action in state court in 2015, claiming a priority mortgage. Despite Giehl's attempts to dismiss the action and dissolve the foreclosure, the Florida state courts entered a final judgment in favor of Bank of America in 2019. Giehl appealed this judgment through the Florida state appellate system, including the Florida Supreme Court, but his efforts were unsuccessful. He also filed multiple notices of lis pendens and motions to vacate the judgment, all of which were denied. Giehl then removed the case to federal district court, alleging fraud, illegal foreclosure, and Fourth Amendment violations by the private defendants. The District Court dismissed the case with prejudice, citing both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata, and dissolved the lis pendens. Giehl appealed this dismissal.

The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo, emphasizing that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must satisfy themselves of their own jurisdiction. The court clarified the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, noting that it bars federal district courts from reviewing or rejecting state court judgments rendered before the federal litigation began. However, the court explained that Rooker-Feldman does not bar independent claims that simply deny a legal conclusion reached by the state court, such as claims for damages against private parties for conduct during state proceedings. In this case, Giehl sought damages and criminal charges against private defendants, not a reversal of the state court judgment, so Rooker-Feldman did not apply. Instead, the court found that Giehl's claims were barred because they were wholly insubstantial and frivolous. His Fourth Amendment claim failed because the amendment does not apply to private parties absent state action, and the defendants were private entities. Furthermore, the federal criminal statutes he cited do not contain private rights of action. Consequently, the court held that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.

The case is remanded to the federal district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The dismissal must be based on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the insubstantiality of the federal claims, not on res judicata or Rooker-Feldman. The district court also erred in dissolving the lis pendens, as it lacked the power to do so when its only authority was to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Giehl may pursue further state court proceedings, but his federal claims are effectively barred.

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