Greg Murphy, a maintenance carpenter for the Beaumont Independent School District, sued the district and its superintendent, Shannon Allen, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 following his termination during the COVID-19 pandemic. The dispute arose when the district implemented a premium pay policy for employees working during emergency closures. While the district closed buildings to the public, it required certain employees to work for modified operations. Murphy, a nonexempt employee, was denied premium pay because the superintendent determined his role did not involve 'consistent, prolonged exposure to the public,' a criterion not explicitly stated in the written policy. Murphy filed a grievance and circulated a petition regarding the pay disparity. Subsequently, he was arrested for making a terroristic threat after an employee reported Murphy allegedly mentioned a bomb in a joke, and he was terminated for the threat and refusal to cooperate with an investigation. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, but Murphy appealed, arguing violations of substantive and procedural due process, First Amendment retaliation, and Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution.
The Fifth Circuit began by addressing Murphy's substantive and procedural due process claims. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, municipal liability requires a policymaker, an official policy, and a violation of constitutional rights. The court agreed that the superintendent was a policymaker and that the district's written policy constituted an official policy. The critical dispute was whether Murphy had a protected property interest in the premium pay. The district court had ruled that Murphy failed to show a protected interest because the policy allowed discretion and the district argued the pandemic was a 'modified operation' rather than an 'emergency closure.' The Fifth Circuit disagreed, noting that the policy explicitly used mandatory language ('shall be paid') for nonexempt employees required to work during an emergency closing. The court found that the district's own actions of paying other employees during the same period rebutted its argument that the policy did not apply. Furthermore, the superintendent's authority was limited to 'implementing' the policy, not amending it to add new criteria like 'public exposure.' Because Murphy presented evidence that he met the policy's explicit requirements, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether he was arbitrarily denied a benefit he was entitled to under the policy. Consequently, the court vacated the summary judgment on these claims. Regarding the First Amendment and Fourth Amendment claims, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. For the First Amendment retaliation claim, the court found that while Murphy engaged in protected activity, the record contained evidence of legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for his termination and the misconduct notice. Specifically, the investigation into the bomb threat was supported by multiple witness statements. For the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, the court emphasized that a criminal prosecution in retaliation for speech must lack probable cause. Although the charges were eventually dismissed for insufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court held that the witness statements provided sufficient probable cause for the arrest. The court also rejected Murphy's argument that the district court abused its discretion by excluding a declaration from the arresting officer, noting that the excluded portions were conclusory and did not create a genuine issue of material fact. Finally, the court addressed qualified immunity for Superintendent Allen. While the court found a potential constitutional violation regarding the due process claims, it held that the right was not 'clearly established' at the time of the alleged misconduct. Citing Board of Regents v. Roth, the court reasoned that the specific application of the premium pay policy during the unique confusion of the COVID-19 pandemic did not provide clear notice to a reasonable official that denying Murphy pay would violate the Constitution. Thus, Allen was entitled to qualified immunity on the individual capacity claims.
The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings specifically on Murphy's substantive and procedural due process claims regarding the premium pay. The district court must now determine if Murphy is entitled to the premium pay based on the policy's plain language and the district's past practices. The ruling on the First Amendment and Fourth Amendment claims stands, meaning Murphy cannot proceed with those theories of liability. The decision clarifies that while school districts cannot arbitrarily deny benefits promised in their own policies, officials may still be shielded by qualified immunity if the legal boundaries of those benefits were not clearly established during a novel emergency situation.
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