Case Explained: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ANDRE DE MOYA Consolidated with 24-3030, 24-3031 Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:19-cr-00158-1) (No. 1:19-cr-00228-1) Barry Coburn, appointed by the court, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant Andre De Moya. Stephen C Leckar, appointed by the court, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant Anthony Merritt Katherine M. Kelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeanine Ferris 2 Pirro, U.S. Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb and Eric Hansford, Assistant U.S. Attorneys

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-07

The D.C. Circuit affirmed the bribery and fraud convictions and sentences of Andre De Moya and Anthony Merritt, rejecting all appellate challenges regarding evidence sufficiency, jury instructions, ineffective assistance of counsel, and trial penalty claims. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that De Moya knowingly participated in a scheme where cash payments were exchanged for specific official acts by a District of Columbia tax official to reduce business tax liabilities, satisfying the elements of conspiracy, bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201, and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346. While the court acknowledged that the district court’s jury instruction regarding a “course of conduct” theory for bribery was in tension with Supreme Court precedent requiring a specific quid pro quo link between payments and official acts, it ruled this error harmless because the government presented evidence of discrete transactions where each payment corresponded to a specific tax adjustment, meaning the jury necessarily found facts satisfying the correct legal standard. The court further denied Merritt’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under *Strickland v. Washington*, finding no prejudice because his trial counsel successfully argued for a substantial downward variance from the Sentencing Guidelines range, rendering the failure to raise additional policy arguments regarding the Loss Table irrelevant to the final sentence. Finally, the court rejected the argument that Merritt was unconstitutionally penalized for going to trial, noting that the increased sentencing range resulted from the withdrawal of plea agreement concessions—specifically the loss of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and the addition of enhancements for leadership and obstruction of justice—rather than punishment for exercising his right to a trial. Consequently, the judgments of the district court remain in full force, and the defendants must serve their imposed prison terms and supervised release.

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