Case Explained: NORMAN WANG v. UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH; UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MEDICAL CENTER; UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH PHYSICIANS; SAMIR SABA; MARK GLADWIN, et al

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-07

The Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and summary judgment rulings, holding that Dr. Norman Wang’s defamation claims against five defendants (Dr. Kathryn Berlacher, Dr. Samir Saba, the American Heart Association, the University of Pittsburgh, and the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center) survive a motion to dismiss, and his civil-rights retaliation claims under Title VII, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Title VI also proceed against the relevant defendants. The court affirmed the dismissal of Wang’s First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to a lack of state action. Regarding defamation, the court applied Pennsylvania law and the actual malice standard for limited-purpose public figures established in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*. The court determined that statements accusing Wang of “misquoting,” “misreading” sources, and acting with “racist thinking” were actionable assertions of fact rather than protected academic opinions because they implied undisclosed facts about his professional integrity. The court found Wang plausibly alleged actual malice against Berlacher and Saba, who made rapid social media accusations despite having access to easily verifiable citations that contradicted their claims, and against the American Heart Association, which issued retraction notices and press releases accusing Wang of “deliberate misinformation” without providing him notice or an opportunity to rebut the charges. The court held that the truth defense could not defeat the claim at the dismissal stage because the defendants’ allegations of numerous errors were exaggerated compared to the minor factual discrepancies identified. Regarding retaliation, the court applied the *McDonnell Douglas* burden-shifting framework under Title VII, § 1981, and the PHRA. It held that Wang engaged in protected activity by opposing what he reasonably believed were illegal racial preferences in medical education, both through his published article and statements made during a meeting with his supervisors. The court found genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the demotion, removal from his fellowship directorship, bans on teaching, and social media campaigns constituted adverse employment actions that would dissuade a reasonable worker from opposing discrimination, and whether these actions were causally linked to his protected speech. For Title VI, the court held that while Wang’s claim against the hospital system survives because residency programs receive federal funds for employment purposes, his claim against the university must be dismissed unless amended to allege that the primary purpose of the university’s federal funding was employment. The practical consequence is that the defamation claims against Berlacher, Saba, the American Heart Association, the University of Pittsburgh, and UPMC will proceed to discovery and trial. The civil-rights retaliation claims under Title VII, § 1981, and PHRA will also proceed against all defendants, while the Title VI claim against the hospital system proceeds but the claim against the university is vacated for potential amendment. The First Amendment § 1983 claim is dismissed because the private hospital system and physician practice are not state actors, and the University of Pittsburgh cannot be held liable under *Monell* standards as Wang failed to allege a policy or custom causing the constitutional violation.

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