Background
Leonard Brown, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appealed the district court’s denial of his postconviction motion filed under Section twenty-two hundred fifty-four to vacate his sentence. Brown had pleaded guilty to two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of Section ninety-two four C. The indictment alleged that the predicate crime of violence for each count was attempted armed bank robbery. Brown argued that under the Supreme Court’s decision in United States versus Davis, attempted armed bank robbery did not qualify as a crime of violence and could not serve as a predicate offense. The district court denied the motion but granted a certificate of appealability on the specific question of whether attempted armed bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence.
The court’s reasoning
The court reviewed de novo the district court’s determination that an offense is a crime of violence under Section ninety-two four C. Under federal law, a crime of violence must have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another. The Supreme Court in Davis held that the residual clause of Section ninety-two four C is unconstitutionally vague, leaving only the elements clause. Brown argued that attempted armed bank robbery does not qualify under the elements clause. However, the Eleventh Circuit previously held in United States versus Armstrong that attempted armed bank robbery qualifies because it requires the defendant to act by force, violence, or intimidation. The court noted that a prior panel decision is binding on all subsequent panels unless overruled or undermined by the Supreme Court or the court sitting en banc. Since Armstrong remains binding, the court concluded that the district court correctly denied the motion.
What it means going forward
This decision reinforces the binding nature of prior Eleventh Circuit panel decisions regarding the definition of crimes of violence under Section ninety-two four C, limiting the ability of federal prisoners to challenge Section ninety-two four C convictions based on attempted armed bank robbery.