Arthur Miles was sentenced in October 2022 and April 2023 to a total of 300 months for federal convictions. Between his first sentencing and his eventual transfer to the Federal Medical Center in Devens, Massachusetts, Miles spent fifteen months housed at the Marion County Jail in Indiana. During this interim period, he worked as an orderly. Miles filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) violated the First Step Act by refusing to award him time credits for this work. The district court dismissed his petition, deferring to BOP regulations that stated credits could only begin after an inmate arrived at a federal facility and underwent a risk assessment. The magistrate judge had recommended dismissal of the BOP's motion, noting the conflict between the regulations and the statute, but the district court rejected that recommendation.
Circuit Judge Lipez, writing for the panel, analyzed the First Step Act's statutory text against the BOP's implementing regulations. The court first addressed the definition of when a sentence commences. The First Step Act states that a sentence commences when a defendant is 'received in custody awaiting transportation to… the official detention facility.' The court found the BOP's regulation, which defined commencement as the date of arrival at the facility, to be irreconcilable with this text and therefore invalid. The court reasoned that the statutory phrase 'awaiting transportation' necessarily encompasses time spent in custody at a non-federal facility before transfer. Second, the court addressed whether the risk and needs assessment is a prerequisite for earning credits. While the statute requires the assessment to determine appropriate programming, the court held that it is not a prerequisite for the *earning* of credits. The statute mandates that eligible prisoners be provided the opportunity to participate in programs 'throughout their entire term of incarceration.' Denying credits for pre-assessment participation would undermine this mandate. The court clarified that while the assessment is required before credits can be *applied* to reduce a sentence, it is not required to *earn* them. Finally, the court held that the location of the programming cannot be determinative. If a prisoner participates in qualifying work while awaiting transfer, the BOP must consider it for credits, provided the participation can be verified. The court rejected the BOP's argument that logistical challenges in tracking non-federal programming excuse the denial of credits, noting that the BOP did not claim it could not verify Miles' work.
The decision requires the BOP to make individualized determinations regarding time credits for prisoners who perform qualifying work while housed in non-federal facilities between sentencing and transfer. It invalidates the BOP's regulatory cutoff for credit eligibility and establishes that the risk assessment is not a barrier to earning credits, only to applying them. The case is remanded to the district court to determine if Miles' specific work as an orderly qualifies under the First Step Act and to calculate any resulting sentence reduction.