Julius Augillard was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The underlying facts involved two arrests: one in December 2023 where police found him trespassing with a pistol and various drugs, and another in February 2023 during Mardi Gras where he was caught with a loaded firearm and multiple baggies of marijuana and cocaine. Augillard pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. The probation officer calculated his base offense level at 22, adding four levels for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony, and then reducing the level by three for accepting responsibility, resulting in an advisory sentencing range of 70 to 87 months. The district court sentenced Augillard to 70 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Augillard appealed, challenging the classification of his prior drug conviction, the firearm enhancement, the conflict between the oral and written judgment regarding supervised release conditions, and the constitutionality of the statute under the Second Amendment.
The court addressed four issues. First, regarding the prior drug conviction, Augillard argued that his 2011 Louisiana conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine should not count as a 'controlled substance offense' because the state statute was facially broader than the federal Controlled Substance Act due to the inclusion of Ioflupane. The court explained that under the categorical approach, a defendant must show a 'realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility' that the state would apply its statute to conduct outside the federal definition. Citing Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez and its own precedent in United States v. Castillo-Rivera, the court held that Augillard failed to satisfy this test because he could not point to any actual Louisiana case where Ioflupane was prosecuted under that statute. The court explicitly rejected Augillard's argument that Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Taylor and Brown v. United States abrogated Castillo-Rivera, noting that Taylor declined to extend the realistic probability test to federal statutes without federalism concerns, and Brown did not mention the test at all. Second, the court reviewed the four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony. Distinguishing United States v. Jeffries, where a single rock of crack and a gun were insufficient, the court found that Augillard's possession of a loaded firearm alongside a significant volume of drugs in distinct packaging during a major festival supported the finding that the gun facilitated the drug trafficking. Third, the court addressed the supervised release condition. The district court orally pronounced that Augillard 'may be required' to participate in treatment if he tested positive, but the written judgment made it mandatory that he 'shall participate.' The court held that because this was a discretionary condition, the oral pronouncement controls, and the written judgment's broadening of the restriction constituted an abuse of discretion. Finally, the court noted that the Second Amendment challenge was foreclosed by existing circuit precedent.
The decision affirms the 70-month prison sentence and the application of the realistic probability test for determining prior drug convictions in the Fifth Circuit, limiting arguments based solely on facial statutory overbreadth without actual case law. The practical consequence of the partial vacation is a remand to the district court solely to amend the written judgment to remove the mandatory language regarding outpatient treatment, ensuring it aligns with the oral pronouncement that such treatment is discretionary. This remand does not affect the prison term or other conditions of supervised release.